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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE APPELLANT HAS CARRIED IT'S BURDEN OF MARSHALING 
THE EVIDENCE AS IT RELATES TO THE APPELLANT'S 
SCHEDULE C AND THE TESTIMONY OF BECKY MACKENZIE 
The evidence regarding Appellant's Schedule C and the testimony of Becky 
MacKenzie is adequately marshaled at pages 10 and 11 of the Appellant's Brief The 
Appellant's marshaling of evidence includes with regard to Schedule C includes the 
following: 
'Ms. Mackenzie also testified that wages could not be reported on a Schedule 
C and that a taxpayer cannot take a business deduction against wages for a 
vehicle, advertising, office expenses or utility payments. (Tr. 262.9-263.24). 
Ms. Mackenzie testified that it was her opinion that Mr. Thompson was not 
entitled to any Schedule C deductions based on her understanding that he had 
earned all of his income as an employee of Neways. (Tr. 274. 6-10). Based 
on this assumption Ms. Mackenzie concluded by testifying that she had 
examined the defendant's tax statements and examined the documents created 
by Ned Shimizu, and determined that the defendant owed a net tax deficiency 
of $2,142.56. (Tr. 267.19). Ms. Mackenzie also testified that determining 
whether a person is an employee or an independence contractor is extremely 
complex and the subject of thousands of cases across the United States and 
that she did not know whose legal obligation it is to determine the answer. 
(Tr. 276). She also testified that normally the worker makes the determination 
of which he is. (Tr. 278.1). She further testified that if the employer 
incorrectly categorizes an employee as an independent contractor, it is the 
employer that must pay the underpayment of taxes. (Tr. 278. 22-23). Ms. 
Mackenzie further testified that it is her position that it was Neways that 
wrongfully categorized Mr. Thompson when they gave him the 1099, but that 
the State had failed to seek the additional taxes from Neways. (Tr. 278.24-
79.8)." 
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Merely because the State does not like the marshaled evidence, is not an argument that 
it has not been marshaled. The evidence as it relates to the Defendant's Schedule C issues 
is utterly devoid of any criminal intent. Ms. Mackenzie's testimony is that the income of 
Defendant should not have been reported on Schedule C. Ms. Mackenzie also testified that 
the Schedule C issues are extraordinarily complex. There is no evidence that the error of 
using Schedule C (if Ms. Mackenzie's correct) is criminal as opposed to mere negligence. 
IL 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
The Prosecution's case is replete with phrases such as boast and gloat with regard to 
Mr. Thompson's alleged intentional conduct. However, when the actual facts of the case are 
examined, it is clear that the characterizations by the Prosecution of become the essence of 
the Prosecution's case. 
Alan Davis did testify that the Defendant told him that he would be able to work at 
Neways and enter his income tax free. (Tr. 47. 18-19 page 47). However, even if Mr. 
Thompson had said this to Davis, such is not evidence of a crime. To speak of such matters 
is not a criminal act. Also, when pressed on this issue, Davis admitted that the discussion 
was limited to Davis receiving tax free income not Thompson. (Tr. 47). The record is 
replete and uncontroverted that Defendant and Neways agreed that an account would be kept 
for Mr. Thompson's personal account, and kept separate from all other Neways expenses 
related to the legal department. (Tr. 140, and 321). The Defendant relied upon Neways to 
2 
account for his remuneration. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the 
Defendant relied on the tax statements provided to him by Neways. The evidence is 
uncontroverted in the form of Annette Jenkins testimony. Ms. Jenkins, an accountant for 
Neways testified that the Defendant never told her that he did not want a 1099 (Tr. 165.23), 
and that all the interested parties understood, and agreed from the beginning that all such 
amounts would be properly reported on a 1099, rather he simply voiced displeasure because 
he felt that the 1099 he received was too high. All of the witnesses introduced by the State 
admitted that they did not know with any degree of certainty which 1099 was correct and 
which amount should be included therein. 
In essence, the Appellant was convicted below for the following: 
1. Not liking to pay taxes, 
2. Requesting that his remuneration from Neways be paid directly to creditors, 
3. Objecting to the 1099 submitted by Neways to him based upon his alleged 
belief that the 1099 was in error, 
4. His reliance upon the Amended 1099 supplied by Neways, and 
5. Reporting the income information as provided by Neways on his 1040 
Schedule C. 
Once the 1099 was received by Defendant from Neways, the only place it could have 
been reported is on a Schedule C. In fact the testimony of Ms. Mackenzie to the effect that 
"determining whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is extremely 
complex, and the subject of thousand of cases across the United States, and that she did not 
3 
know whose legal obligation it is to determine the answer." (Tr. 276). Factually ratifies the 
Defendant's position. What Ms. Mackenzie did know was that if the employer incorrectly 
categorizes an employee as an independent contractor, it is the employer who must pay the 
underpayment of taxes. (Tr. 278.22-23). Ms. Mackenzie further testified that she believed 
it was Neways that wrongfully categorized Mr. Thompson when they gave him the 1099. 
(Tr. 278.24.79.8). 
in. 
THE STATES BALD ASSERTION THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
RELIANCE UPON FEDERAL LAW IS MISPLACED AND SIMPLY 
CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY LAW 
The United States Supreme Court determined in Cheek v. United States, 490 U.S. 192 
(1990), that absent proof of specific intent an individual cannot be criminally liable for 
failure to abide by this nation's tax laws. The Form 1099 which was offered into evidence 
by the States is a federal tax form. Schedule C which the State offered as evidence of the 
Defendant's criminal intent was a federal tax form and was part of the Defendant's 
underlying Form 1040 for the relevant year. To argue that the applicable federal law 
construing criminal conduct as it relates to those forms should not govern this Court, is to 
ignore the reality of the States reliance upon federal tax forms as the foundation of it's 
income tax systems. The record is utterly devoid of any evidence whatsoever of intentional 
or inadvertent conduct made by the Defendant on any State tax returns. 
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IV. 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION 
AS TO GOOD FAITH RELIANCE. 
The standard for criminal tax liability was set out by United States Supreme Court in 
Cheek. The case is sited by the State for the instruction with course not acts cases, nor the 
underlying principles preceded by the Supreme Court in Cheek. The State has failed to 
provide a single case where a Federal Appellate Circuit Court held anything other than that 
failure to give instructions to with respect to the Defendant's good faith reliance upon an 
accountant or other expert constitutes reversible error, where some evidence existed to 
support such a defense. United States v. Duncan. 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988); United 
States v.Mitchell. 495 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Piatt. 435 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 
1970); Burstenv. United States. 395 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1968); and United States v. Phillips. 
217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1954). Of course, each of those cited above provide mandate that the 
instruction must be given explicitly, and may not simply be implied by the culmination of 
other similar instructions as argued by State at page 16 of it's Brief. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The Defendant filed a Motion for a new trial, and it is clear from the four corners of 
the Plaintiffs Motion that it attacked Defendants knowing use of Davis' perjured testimony. 
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The Defendant objected to the use of Exhibit 1 which related to Davis' perjured testimony. 
The essence of the States claim to justify perjured testimony is found at paragraph 26 of the 
Appellee's Brief is as follows: "finally, the evidence establishing Defendant's guilt was 
strong. Thus testimony that Davis obtained a copy of Defendant's ledger from Defendant's 
wife after Defendant had abused her is not the type of evidence that would render a different 
result probable on the retrial of the issues." The Davis testimony is inconsistent and using 
the standard set out in Walker v. State of Utah. 624 P.2d 687, the States knowing use of 
perjured testimony must warrant a new trial. 
VI. 
THE MALFUNCTION OF THE VIDEO TAPE WORKS AS 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE ON THE DEFENDANT AS IT 
RELATES TO HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE VERDICT WAS 
CONTRADICTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The State argues that it has properly reconstructed the evidence by affidavit. Of 
course, the affidavit is not the actual transcript which cannot now be recreated. In State v. 
TunzL 2000 Utah 38 (Utah 2000), the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that attempts to 
reconstruct a record often impair a defendants right of appeal, it is preferable to simply order 
a new trial. TunzL is law of the State of Utah, the half-hearted attempts at an affidavit to 
substitute for the record 2.5 years after the trial cannot substitute for the real thing. 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court in Cheek held that under pining of the criminal tax 
law is to convict only those who intentionally violate its terms. In the case before the Court, 
the Defendant relied upon documents submitted by Neways to file the tax return in question. 
He included information which he received from Neways on the only place form it could be 
legally reported. The essence of the States claim's trespass on the principles set out in 
Cheek. The Defendants good faith reliance upon information provided for him should not 
result in a criminal conviction and the Defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
DATED this /0 day of December, 2001. 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
David O. Black 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
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